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I. Introduction 
 
European Union conflicts rules are well established in cross-border contracts compared 
to many other areas. The harmonised conflicts system in contract at the Community 
level was established by 1980 through the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and 
recognition and enforcement of judgments and the Rome Convention on applicable 
law.1 The system was later updated and modernised on a number of occasions. The 
Brussels Convention had been replaced by the Brussels I Regulation in 2001,2 which 
was then revised by the Recast Regulation in 2012.3 The Rome Convention was 
replaced by the Rome I Regulation in 2008.4 Regardless of the recent modernisation of 
the European Union (‘EU’) contractual conflicts system, the Court of Justice of the EU 
(‘CJEU’) interpretation of relevant rules in the predecessors often continues to be 
applicable to the current law.5 There is rich case law concerning interpretation and 
application of the contractual conflicts system in court practice.  
Considering both jurisdiction and choice of law rules, EU conflicts system in 
contract demonstrates two main objectives: certainty and fairness. Certainty is the 
major principle for commercial contracts. In such contracts, where the parties are 
sophisticated commercial players with equal bargaining power, the law is not playing a 
role to create unnecessary compliance costs to the parties, but to protect the parties’ 
reasonable expectations. It is trusted that the parties should be entitled to handle their 
own affairs rationally and any unreasonable legal intervention is undesirable. The law, 
therefore, should promote efficiency by encouraging the parties to comply with their 
agreement, or by directing the parties to the country which is naturally predictable by 
both parties at the time of contracting. The objective of certainty is expressly stated in 
the recital of both the Recast Regulation and Rome I.6 
Fairness is the main principle for special contracts with the inequality of bargaining 
and litigation power, including consumer, employment and insurance contracts. It is 
believed that in those contracts the stronger party may abuse its power to the 
disadvantage of the weaker party and the conflicts rules should be tilted in favour of 
the weaker party to balance the unequal power. The objective of fairness, in terms of 
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weaker party protection, is also demonstrated in the recitals.7 However, certainty 
continues to be one of the major concerns. The protection granted to the weak should 
be appropriate and not cause unnecessary cost to business. Certainty also helps the 
weaker party to access to justice.  
 
II. Conflicts rules in commercial contracts 
 
A. Party autonomy 
  
Party autonomy grants the parties the freedom to choose the competent court and the 
applicable law. Although this principle is now also adopted for non-contractual 
litigation,8 it plays a more significant role in contractual litigation. Contract creates a 
premeditated relationship between the parties, which allows the parties to plan and 
allocate litigation risk in advance, including negotiating and concluding a jurisdiction 
and choice of law clause. It could, in principle, provide certainty and predictability.  
In practice, however, party autonomy could not prevent all disputes and uncertainty 
on jurisdiction and applicable law. In particular, the EU conflicts rules provide much 
flexibility to the parties to designate the chosen forum and law. Furthermore, 
commercial contracts, in many cases, are entered into very quickly, informally, orally, 
or they sometimes involve multiple documents of different kinds.9 The flexible EU law 
and unconventional means to conclude commercial contracts may generate disputes on 
party autonomy. It is reasonable to argue that party autonomy could produce certainty 
in principle, but the specific rules should be carefully thought-through to make certainty 
really happen. 
 
i. Existence of a choice 
 
Disputes may arise as to the existence of a conflicts clause, for example, whether the 
conflicts clause contained in a separate document is successfully incorporated in the 
current contract,10 whether the parties have a consensus on an alleged jurisdiction clause 
inserted unilaterally by one party,11 and whether the parties agree on a jurisdiction 
clause impliedly by following their common business patterns or having mutual 
understanding of the common practice in the profession.12 The Recast Regulation does 
not provide clear rules on determining the existence of a jurisdiction clause. Instead, it 
provides relatively broad rules on the formality of a jurisdiction clause. A choice of 
court agreement may be formally valid if it is in writing or evidenced in writing, in a 
form that accords with common practice between the parties or in a form that accords 
with international usage.13 The formal requirements are exhaustive. Under the national 
law of some countries, an agreement may be concluded orally or by conduct; however 
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such an agreement would fall foul of Article 25 if it does not meet one of the conditions 
therein.14 Does it mean that Article 25(1) determines not only whether a jurisdiction 
clause is formally valid but also whether it is actually concluded? It has been suggested 
by some that if an agreement is concluded in a form in accordance with Article 25, it is 
deemed enough evidence proving that a choice exists as the purpose of the formal 
requirement is to ensure the existence of consent.15 This is particularly true in terms of 
the latter two conditions in the provision. Common practice and commercial usage are 
used by some courts to ascertain the existence of consent in the absence of an explicit 
agreement, and the consent is presumed to exist where the jurisdiction clause is 
consistent with the common practice between the parties or the international usage.16 
Article 25 thus excludes the application of national law in determining the existence 
and formal validity of a jurisdiction clause.  
However, others disagree.17 They intend to examine whether a jurisdiction clause 
is subject to a consensus between the parties first,18 especially in contracts not 
concluded in a formal manner, such as the incorporation of a standard form contract in 
a separate document,19 subscribing to the company statute by a shareholder,20 the battle 
of the form case, and contracts concluded online.21 Even within courts treating 
existence and formal validity as separate issues, different approaches are adopted to 
examine the existence of a clause. The CJEU usually does not apply national law or 
conflict of laws to the issue of existence, but it treats the existence of consensus as a 
matter of fact and relies on evidence to prove if the parties have entered into an 
agreement.22 The most the CJEU has done is, based on the evidence and facts of the 
case, take the existence of consensus into consideration to interpret if a jurisdiction 
clause meets the formal requirements in Article 25(1).23 National courts, on the other 
hand, may apply national law instead. For example, Ryanair v Billigfluege.de GMBH24 
concerned a ‘browse-wrap’ contract which contained a jurisdiction clause. Before 
applying the formal requirements under Article 23(1) of Brussels I which corresponds 
to Article 25(1) of the Recast, the Irish High Court examined whether the party’s 
screen-scraping activity constituted consent to the jurisdiction clause and it applied 
national law to decide if the jurisdiction agreement was successfully concluded.25 
This issue has long existed in the Brussels jurisdiction scheme, and it has not been 
simplified after the Recast Regulation modernised the previous jurisdiction rules. The 
Recast Regulation has made an important reform by introducing a uniform choice of 
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law rule on the substantive validity of jurisdiction clauses.26 However, the existence 
and substantive validity of a contract term are two separate issues27 and it is not clearly 
suggested that the same choice of law shall be applicable in deciding whether a 
jurisdiction clause has been concluded. 
 
ii. Lis pendens and ‘Italian Torpedo’ 
 
One of the most important improvements of the Recast Regulation is the legislative 
correction of the Gasser v MISAT28 judgment that unreasonably have hampered the 
effectiveness of a jurisdiction clause and encouraged an ‘Italian Torpedo’.29 According 
to Gasser, a non-chosen court, if seised first, would have priority over a chosen court 
in a jurisdiction clause in ruling on the validity of such a clause. The Recast Regulation 
finally reforms the lis pendens rule in Article 31 which provides that: 
 
“2. Without prejudice to Article 26, where a court of a Member State on which an 
agreement as referred to in Article 25 confers exclusive jurisdiction is seised, any 
court of another Member State shall stay the proceedings until such time as the court 
seised on the basis of the agreement declares that it has no jurisdiction under the 
agreement. 
3. Where the court designated in the agreement has established jurisdiction in 
accordance with the agreement, any court of another Member State shall decline 
jurisdiction in favour of that court.” 
 
Pursuant to the new Article 31, a chosen court now has priority over a non-chosen but 
first seised court. This revision largely improves effectiveness of a choice of court 
clause and provides certainty to the parties. However, what if the chosen court is not 
seised? In such a case, lis pendens does not exist. If a non-chosen court is obliged to 
stay jurisdiction wherever a defendant alleges that a jurisdiction clause exists, it may 
create an unreasonable barrier to the claimant. It would be particularly unfair if a valid 
jurisdiction clause indeed does not exist and the claimant is forced to sue in the alleged 
chosen court. A defendant would have to bring the action in the chosen court before it 
could apply for a stay under Article 31(2) of the Regulation. If not, the non-chosen court 
still could take jurisdiction.30 
This interpretation may encourage a defendant to act quickly in order to prevent 
being sued in a non-chosen forum. However, what if the defendant brings the action in 
the chosen court excessively late? Where a defendant believes the non-chosen court has 
no jurisdiction, it may not submit a defence and it may simply ignore the action. 
According to the above analysis, the seised court may take jurisdiction and continue the 
substantive proceedings. The defendant, once being aware of the consequence, may 
bring the action in the chosen court and challenge jurisdiction at this stage. Would the 
application for stay be rejected by the reason of delay? The Recast Regulation does not 
suggest anywhere it could. Rejection is inconsistent with the explicit wording of Article 
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31(2). However, it is inappropriate to award the defendant the right to challenge 
jurisdiction of the seised court at any stage of the proceedings, which would cause 
delay, waste of resources and costs. The EU authority should clarify the procedural 
requirement for the application for a stay under Article 31(2). 
 
B. Special jurisdiction 
 
Although the EU party autonomy rules are not free from criticism, they still largely 
reduce uncertainty and litigation risk in commercial contracts. More difficulty exists in 
contracts in the absence of choice. In such circumstances, the defendant should either 
be sued in its domicile,31 or pursuant to one of the special jurisdiction rules based on 
the close connection principle or as one of multiple defendants in the domicile of any 
of the defendants where the actions are closely connected.32 It is necessary to note that 
although suing under the general jurisdiction is more straightforward and rarely rejected 
by courts, the claimant usually wishes to sue the defendant in other countries, which 
may be the claimant’s domicile or the natural forum where evidence is more readily 
accessible. Therefore, special jurisdiction is relied on more frequently than general 
jurisdiction in practice. 
Special jurisdiction rules in contracts are contained in Article 7(1) of the Recast 
Regulation which states that:  
 
“A person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member State: 
(1) (a) in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of 
performance of the obligation in question; 
(b) for the purpose of this provision and unless otherwise agreed, the place 
of performance of the obligation in question shall be: 
— in the case of the sale of goods, the place in a Member State where, under 
the contract, the goods were delivered or should have been delivered, 
— in the case of the provision of services, the place in a Member State 
where, under the contract, the services were provided or should have been 
provided; 
(c) if point (b) does not apply then point (a) applies.” 
 
Article 7(1) clearly demonstrates the legislative purpose to improve certainty. Its 
precedent, Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention, only contains point (a) of the 
provision that leaves much doubt on which country is the place of performance of the 
obligation in question.33 Article 7(1) simplifies this issue by providing a straightforward 
rule for the sales and services contracts. However, Article 7(1) (Article 5(1) of the 
Brussels I Regulation) is not free from criticism. A number of questions continue to 
present in practice which need further clarification. 
 
i. Place of performance by agreement 
 
Firstly, the place of performance could be agreed by the parties. If such an agreement 
exists, the agreed place would have special jurisdiction under Article 7(1). However, 
must the agreement be express or could it also be implied? The CJEU might have 
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suggested an affirmative answer. Article 7(1)(b) is clearly worded in a way suggesting 
the place of delivery and the place where services are provided should be determined 
‘under the contract’. In other words, all contract terms should be considered to figure 
out the parties’ intention.34 In Electrosteel Europe SA v Edil Centro Spa,35 the sale of 
goods contract between the Italian seller and the French buyer contained an ‘ex works’ 
clause. Pursuant to Incoterm, this clause means that the carrier took charge of the goods 
at the seller’s premises and delivered them to the buyer’s place of business. Referring 
to then Article 23(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, which accepts implied choice of court 
through international commercial usages, the CJEU believed that there is no reason to 
preclude international usage from being used in interpreting other provisions of the 
Regulation.36 In deciding the place of delivery ‘under the contract’, the court must take 
account of all contract terms and international usage, including Incoterms.37  
 
ii. Sales involving carriage of goods 
 
It is presumed that the place of delivery and the place where services are provided are 
easy to determine, which, however, is not true. Taking international sale of goods as an 
example, the contract usually includes the carriage of goods. The seller would deliver 
the goods to the carrier, who would transport the goods and deliver them to the buyer. 
It is questionable whether the place of delivery is the final destination of the goods, 
which usually is the domicile of the buyer; the place where the seller delivers the goods 
to the carrier, which usually is the domicile of the seller; or the place where the seller 
legally discharges its obligation to deliver. Where the parties have expressly agreed on 
the place of delivery, the chosen place should have jurisdiction under Article 7(1)(b).38 
If the parties do not choose the place of delivery, the CJEU stated, in Car Trim, that the 
place of delivery in an international sale of goods involving international carriage, for 
the purpose of Article 7(1)(b) should be the place ‘where physical transfer of the goods 
took place, as a result of which the purchaser obtained, or should have obtained, actual 
power of disposal over those goods at the final destination of the sales transaction’.39 
This interpretation distinguishes physical transfer of goods, from transfer of risk and 
transfer of ownership. It is possible that the risk and ownership are transferred to the 
buyer before actual physical delivery. Although the buyer may legally acquire the 
ownership and power of disposal at a different time and place, only the actual/physical 
delivery should be considered to determine jurisdiction. This interpretation reflects the 
objective of certainty and uniformity. The adoption of the factual delivery criterion aims 
to avoid the application of substantive law or private international law of a Member 
State. It was stated in the Commission Proposal for the original Brussels I Regulation 
that one of the purposes for reform of the special jurisdiction rules was to ‘remedy the 
shortcomings of applying the rules of private international law’ and to adopt a 
pragmatic approach based on a purely factual criterion.40 
However, there are two types of factual delivery taking place, ie delivering the 
goods to the first carrier and delivering the goods to the buyer. The CJEU accepts the 
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second place, stating it is ‘the most consistent with the origins, objectives and scheme’ 
of the Regulation. The final destination is highly predictable and has a close proximity 
with the contract.41 The goods usually remain in this place after delivery and the 
operation of the performance of delivery is completed in the final destination.42 This 
interpretation is pro-buyer.   
 
iii. Performance in more than one country 
 
The CJEU has interpreted Article 7(1)(b) in a number of cases where the goods are 
delivered or services provided in more than one Member State. Instead of limiting the 
court’s jurisdiction to performance within its territory, the principle is adopted to 
centralise all the claims arising out of the contract in the principal place of 
performance.43 It helps preventing concurrent proceedings on related claims and 
reducing the litigation cost for the claimant.  
The centralisation approach improves certainty and efficiency and, in particular, 
benefits the claimant. The question is whether it protects the claimant by increasing the 
litigation risk of the defendant. The CJEU suggests that any place of performance 
should be predictable by the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant is also free from 
the risk of being sued in multiple states, and the efficiency resulting by eliminating 
concurrent proceedings benefits not only the claimant but also the defendant.44 These 
arguments are correct assuming that the claimant is willing to bring actions for all the 
claims even if it is required to sue in multiple courts. This may not be true in reality. 
Without the centralisation approach, the claimant would be reluctant to bring multiple 
actions, especially where the loss in some country is small. It may prefer to bring one 
action in the principal place of business only for claims arising out of this country. The 
court, therefore, does not need to examine the performance in other Member States, 
which would reduce litigation costs and increase efficiency. This argument, however, 
is unjustifiable. The localisation approach may force the claimant to give up part of its 
rights to sue and may lead to efficient breach of contracts by the defendant. Efficiency 
should not be achieved at the cost of justice. 
Jurisdiction should be centralised in the country with the closest link with the 
contract. According to the CJEU, this country should be the principal place of 
performance.45 The principal place of performance is determined by considering 
contract terms and, in the absence of contract terms, the actual performance.46 In the 
sales contract, the principal place of delivery is determined pursuant to economic 
criteria;47 in the services contract, where economic criteria cannot be relied on, it 
depends on the time spent and importance of activities carried out in various Member 
States.48 Where the principal place of performance cannot be determined pursuant to 
the above criteria, inconsistent interpretations exist. According to the CJEU in Color 
Drack, the claimant is free to bring the action in the court of any place of delivery for 
all the claims where the principal place of delivery cannot be identified.49 It is also 
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accepted in Rehder v Air Baltic that where the services provided in more than one 
country are indispensible, the claimant could sue in either place of service.50 However, 
in Wood Floor, which concerns the provision of services by commercial agents in 
multiple Member States, the CJEU stated that if the place of the main provision of 
services cannot be determined on the basis of the contract or actual performance, it 
should be identified by taking account of ‘the objectives of predictability and 
proximity’.51 In this particular case, the CJEU held the main place of services lies in 
the agent’s domicile, because it is likely the agent will provide substantial services 
there.52 It raises a question: if the principal place of performance cannot be determined 
by economic criteria, must it be identified by considering the objectives of predictability 
and proximity, or could the claimant directly bring the action in any court of 
performance? It is necessary to note that Rehder v Air Baltic is a dispute between a 
passenger claimant and an airline defendant, which is excluded from the protective 
jurisdiction scheme because it is a transport contract. The CJEU’s decision that permits 
the consumer to sue in either place of performance nevertheless brings the same level 
of protection to the passenger. In Wood Floor, on the other hand, the defendant is a 
commercial agent, which also receives special protection under EU law. The CJEU’s 
decision that limits the claimant’s choice of jurisdiction is consistent with the general 
idea of protection of commercial agents. The two decisions generate a suspicion: given 
that the CJEU gave different decisions in Rehder and Wood Floor, does it intend to set 
up a general principle applicable to all subsequent cases, or is it taking into 
consideration the nature of the disputes and the power balance between the parties? It 
is likely that, although without explicitly saying so, the CJEU has taken the weaker 
party protection into account. This implied intention, however, might bring uncertainty 
to commercial practitioners in practice.   
Furthermore, although the principal place of performance would have the closest 
link with the contract in most cases, it may not have the closest link with the dispute. If 
the defendant, for example, breaches the contract only in the Member States, which are 
not the principal place of delivery, the action against the defendant may have no 
connections with the principal place at all. It is hard to justify centralising the action for 
claims relating to performance in other countries than the principal place of business. 
It is, however, unknown whether the claimant is obliged to either sue in the defendant’s 
domicile, or in the principal place of performance in such circumstances, or whether 
the claimant could sue the defendant in one of the states of delivery which does have 
connections with the actual claim.  
 
iv. Classification 
 
Article 7(1) suffers from classification problems. Before applying Article 7(1), it is 
always necessary to decide, first of all, whether the dispute is ‘a matter in relation to a 
contract’, and secondly, whether the contract is a sale of goods or provision of services 
contract. As a primary principle, concepts in the EU jurisdiction scheme should not be 
interpreted according to national law or private international law, but a uniform 
independent EU meaning.53 In contrast to sale of goods, which is characterised by 
supplying goods and transferring ownership of goods, it is more difficult to define 
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services. The CJEU defines services as one of the parties carries out the particular 
activity in return for remuneration.54 This interpretation is broad enough to cover most 
contracts whose subject matter is labour or professional skills. However, it does not 
make classification of services easier. It still depends on courts’ discretion and should 
be decided in individual cases. Not all ‘particular activities’ amount to services. In 
Falco Privatstiftung v Gisela Weller-Lindhorst,55 the CJEU held that a licensing 
contract is not a contract for provision of services, because the licensor is not required 
to perform any ‘positive’ activity and its obligation under the contract is not to 
challenge the licensee’s use of the intellectual property right.56 It means that only 
‘positive’ activities can be regarded ‘services’.  
What if both parties are required to perform ‘positive’ activities? For example, in 
publication contracts, the author should submit the manuscripts to the publisher 
according to conditions in the contract and grant the publishers the (exclusive) copy 
right. The publisher carries out the activity to produce and distribute the final products. 
Both parties would carry out some positive activities. Is this type of contract falling 
within the scope of services? If so, who is the service provider? It is suggested by the 
CJEU that in complicated contracts involving multiple obligations, classification 
depends on the characteristic obligation.57 Again, it may take some brains to decide 
which obligation, in a complicated contract, is the characteristic one. In the publication 
contract, is it the publisher’s obligation to publish or the author’s obligation to submit 
manuscripts and transfer copyrights?  
Another complicated contract that needs analysis is a franchise contract. Recital 17 
of Rome I suggests that both distribution and franchise contracts are classified as 
services contracts for the purpose of Article 7(1) of the Recast Regulation. This 
interpretation does not bind the court and it may over-simplify the problem. A franchise 
contract also involves the transfer of intellectual property rights: the franchisor allows 
the franchisee to use its trademark/patent to conduct its business in return for monetary 
consideration. This has been ruled as a ‘negative’ obligation and excluded from the 
scope of services. However, the franchisor also has positive obligations to perform, eg 
by providing training and other assistance to the franchisee. Could these obligations 
render the contract a services contract? The answer is not straightforward. The 
franchisor’s obligations include licensing and also training and assistance. However, in 
some franchise contracts, the main obligation is licensing and other obligations are 
supplementary. If one can only take the characteristic obligation into consideration, the 
characteristic obligation in a franchise contract is not much different from a licensing 
contract. In other franchise contracts involving complicated operation skills and 
procedure, training and assistance may be equally important. Such franchise contracts 
might be classified as services.  
Questions may also arise as to remuneration. As a general rule remuneration refers 
to money or other monetary benefits. In Corman-Collins v La Maison du Whisky,58 the 
CJEU rule that remuneration should be interpreted more flexibly to include not only 
monetary payment but also all types of advantages.59 Therefore, a distribution 
agreement is classified as a contract for the provision of services in the Recast 
Regulation. The distributor’s activity to distribute the grantor’s product is the 
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characteristic service. The distributor receives advantages of exclusivity and relevant 
assistance from the supplier, which represent economic values and can be counted as 
remuneration. It is noted that in almost all commercial contracts, both parties would 
receive advantages of certain economic value, which means that the presence of 
remuneration usually should not be a question. 
 
C. Default applicable law 
 
Uncertainty also exists in Rome I.60 Article 4 provides harmonised choice of law rules 
for contracts without a choice of law agreement. Article 4 of Rome I has departed from 
Article 4 of the Rome Convention, by adopting fixed connecting factors for eight 
common types of contracts (the hard and fast rules),61 by limiting the use of the 
principle of characteristic performance,62 and by lifting the threshold of the escape 
clause (the closest connection principle).63 The purpose of the reform is to increase 
certainty and efficiency. 
However, it is hard to argue that Rome I could indeed achieve certainty. Applying 
the hard-and-fast rule usually will be very straightforward, but it suffers from the 
difficulty of classification. Questions may arise to distinguish sale of goods from 
provision of services. The scope of services is also uncertain. If a uniform definition of 
services shall be provided in the conflicts scheme, the case law on the Brussels I Recast 
(Brussels I Regulation) shall be applicable in Rome I.  
The characteristic performance rule applies to contracts falling out of the scope of 
Article 4(1). This rule traditionally suffers from uncertainty. It is not always easy to 
identify the characteristic performer of a contract and in some contracts the 
characteristic performer simply does not exist, eg both parties’ performances are 
equally complicated and important to the operation of the contract. Unfortunately, these 
complicated contracts, in which the characteristic performer cannot be easily identified, 
are generally excluded from the scope of Article 4(1). In other words, Article 4(2) 
cannot offer much help in practice.  
Furthermore, the characteristic performance rule also applies to contracts covered 
by more than one category in Article 4(1).64 The purpose of this condition is to apply 
Article 4(2) to any contracts that cannot be clearly classified as any type in Article 4(1). 
It is, however, necessary to note that although Article 4(1) of Rome I provides different 
connecting factors for eight types of contracts, these contracts are not mutually 
exclusive to each other. For example, sale of goods contracts in Article 4(1)(a) and sale 
of goods by auction in Article 4(1)(g) are overlapping. Recital 17 also suggests that 
services contracts in Article 4(1)(b) cover franchise contracts in Article 4(1)(e) and 
distribution contracts in Article 4(1)(f). The wording of Article 4(2) might indicate that 
all these contracts that fall in one category in general but specific rules are provided for 
them given their special characteristics fall within the scope of Article 4(2). These two 
provisions, therefore, are not perfectly compatible.  
                                                 
60 This Chapter only deals with Art 4. Art 3 of the Rome I Regulation largely follows Art 3 of the 
Rome Convention which has been studied thoroughly in earlier researches. See, eg. J Hill, ‘Choice of 
Law in Contract under the Rome Convention’ (2004) 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
325. 
61 Art 4(1). 
62 Art 4(2). 
63 Art 4(3) and (4). 
64 Art 4(2). 
Where Article 4(1) and (2) cannot apply, the applicable law is determined by the 
closest connection principle.65 This principle may lead to a lot of uncertainty as it 
completely depends on the discretion of the court by calculating and weighing all the 
linking factors of a contract. Different courts may put different weight to some factors. 
In particular, in complicated contracts, multiple connecting factors exist in various 
countries, leading to greater diversity. In such cases, the uniform choice of law rules 
may not lead to the uniformity and the applicable law continues to depend on which 
court hears the case. Furthermore, it is not unusual to find that there is no one single 
country clearly being the centre of gravity. There is no further guidance to designate 
the applicable law in such cases. 
The final difficulty arises out of the escape clause. Even if the governing law may 
be determined pursuant to Article 4(1) and (2), the court may decide the law of the other 
country should apply instead if ‘it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that 
the contract is manifestly more closely connected with’ another country.66 It again 
depends on the court to exercise its decision in determining if there is another country 
with a manifestly closer connection. The word ‘manifestly’ suggests the escape clause 
should not be applied lightly. A mere closer connection would not justify derogation 
from Art 4(1) and (2). However, it is always easier to explain the principle than applying 
it in practice. There is no a clear-cut line between closer connection and manifestly 
closer connection.  
Article 4 of Rome I cannot produce great certainty to the contracting parties. On the 
other hand, the discretion-oriented principles may open new debatable points and 
increase litigation costs. Bearing in mind the difficulty of Article 4, sophisticated 
commercial players may be encouraged to insert choice of law agreements in their 
contracts to reduce future uncertainty.67 
 
III. Contracts with inequality of bargaining power 
 
For contracts with inequality of bargaining power, the EU legislature pays most 
attention to the need of weak party protection. However, certainty continues to be one 
of the objectives. Take consumer contracts as an example. Where the business targets 
a consumer’s domicile, the effect of jurisdiction and choice of law clauses is largely 
limited. The consumer should only be sued in the consumer’s domicile but can choose 
to sue the business either in the business’ domicile or in the consumer’s domicile and 
the consumer can be protected by the level not lower than mandatory rules in his 
habitual residence.68 The test for ‘targeting’ is well designed to ensure certainty. The 
protective conflicts rules balance the purposes of weak party protection and certainty. 
 
A. Targeting test 
 
Is it really easy to decide whether a business has ‘targeted’ a consumer’s domicile or 
habitual residence? A number of judgments have been rendered by the CJEU 
interpreting ‘targeting’ in various circumstances, especially in online contracting. The 
Recast Regulation and Rome I use broad terms. For example, Article 17(1)(c) of the 
Recast Regulation provides that a business has targeted consumers’ domicile if ‘the 
contract has been concluded with a person who pursues commercial or professional 
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activities in the Member State of the consumer’s domicile or, by any means, directs 
such activities to that Member State or to several States including that Member State’.69 
The exact meaning of the broad term ‘direct…to’ generated a lot of debates in the past 
and commentators have proposed a few approaches, such as accessibility,70 
profitability,71 country-specific-indicia,72 activity of the website,73 and ring-fencing,74 
to interpret this concept in online transactions.  
In its recent decisions, the CJEU provides a hybrid approach to interpret the 
meaning of Article 17(1)(c). In the joint judgments for Pammer v Reederei and Hotel 
Alpenhof GesmbH v Heller,75 the CJEU expressly rejected the accessibility approach, 
ie the business is deemed to have targeted the consumer’s home country if it operates a 
website that is accessible in that country. If the only connection between the business 
and the consumer’s domicile, besides the concluded contract, is the accessibility of the 
website, this business does not target that country. The CJEU also ruled that some 
factors are conclusive that the business has targeted the consumer’s home state, for 
example, the business provides an express statement, either on the website or 
somewhere in the contract or confirmation, that it intends to trade with consumers from 
certain countries. Most cases fall between the two scenarios and the court should 
consider all the relevant factors to decide if the business has ‘manifested its intention 
to establish commercial relations’ with consumers domiciled in certain countries. 
Relevant factors include international nature of the activity at issue, the provision of the 
international code of the business telephone number, using the top-level domain of a 
particular foreign country, using the neutral top-level domain, providing itineraries 
guiding travel from other Member States to the business’s home to receive services, 
mentioning the composition of international customers from various Member States, 
language and currency.  
It is important to note that the CJEU judgment is not completely consistent with the 
previous joint statement made by the Council and the Commission which suggests that 
the country specific indicia are irrelevant. Country specific indicia is clearly adopted 
by the CJEU as one of the factors that may indicate the business’s intention. The 
CJEU’s approach is an appropriate one because no rigid guidance can work effectively 
in a cross-border commercial world marked by the frequent adoption of new 
commercial models and the frequent updating of communication technology. The 
flexibility, however, may leave uncertainty to the parties and reduce the business’s 
capacity to manage its commercial risk and set up its marketing strategy.  
In order to provide sufficient protection to consumers, the CJEU ruled that the only 
requirement for the objective connection is the ‘targeting’ test. As far as the business 
has targeted the consumer’s domicile, all consumers in that country could rely on the 
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protective jurisdiction and choice of law rules, irrespective of whether the contract that 
gives rise to the dispute is the direct result of the targeting activity. The protective 
conflicts rules, thus, apply to both distance contracts and contracts concluded in the 
business’s domicile.76 In Emrek v Sabranovic,77 a German consumer bought a car in 
France by placing an order in the French company’s premises in person. The French 
company maintained a website, providing its contact information, including the 
international code of a telephone number. The CJEU held that the protective conflicts 
rules must apply and there is no need for a causal link between the targeting activity 
and the contract. This decision is justifiable in that, firstly, it is hard to prove whether 
the particular contract is the result of the targeting activity and, secondly, once the 
business has targeted a particular country, the business should have reasonable 
expectation that it might be subject to the courts of this country. Although these reasons 
are justifiable, the business may lose the chance to manage its commercial risk. For 
example, it could not predict which transaction, per se, would give rise to the risk of 
cross-border litigation. It also loses the sense to adjust the price of transactions to reflect 
the commercial risk. The final result may be the business would systematically increase 
the price of its products sold online and offline to cover the potential risk of being sued 
abroad. 
 
B. Classification 
 
Classification also leads to some uncertainty. In practice, disputes exist as to whether a 
contract is indeed a ‘consumer contract’. There are a lot of contracts falling in the grey 
area between typical commercial and consumer contracts, such as investment contracts, 
franchising contracts in which the franchisee is an unprofessional individual and 
contracts with mixed purposes. There are inconsistent rulings concerning contracts with 
mixed purposes. In Gruber v Bay Wa,78 the CJEU provides that contracts with mixed 
purposes are non-consumer contracts, except where the usage for business purposes is 
‘so little as to be negligible’. In Ceska Sporitelna AS v Feichter,79 the CJEU stated that 
“[o]nly contracts concluded outside and independently of any trade or professional 
activity or purpose, solely for the purpose of satisfying an individual’s own needs in 
terms of private consumption” are consumer contracts. It does not allow any leeway to 
contracts in which the professional purpose exists but is negligible. The interpretation 
given in Ceska improves certainty, but it reduces the number of contracting parties that 
might enjoy protection as consumers.  
 
C. Efficiency test 
 
It is necessary to note that some commentators argue, from an economic perspective, 
that the protective conflicts rules increase transaction costs for businesses that want to 
enter into a broad internal market. In order to reduce commercial risk, some businesses 
may decide not to trade in other countries and others may decide to increase the price. 
The cost of commercial risk, eventually, will be transferred to consumers.80 This 
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argument presumes that there is a perfect competitive market where the prices could 
correctly reflect the cross-border litigation risk of transactions. In this market, if the 
litigation risk is reduced, the business will accordingly reduce the prices, and vice versa. 
This market, however, does not exist in reality. In other words, without protective 
conflicts rules, businesses may be happy to unilaterally insert jurisdiction and choice of 
law clauses to reduce commercial risks or even to hamper consumers’ ability to sue, 
without reducing prices and taking all the additional benefits result from the reduction 
of risk.81  
One may argue that consumers may enter into contracts rationally by comparing 
various suppliers. If a business inserts an unfavourable conflicts clause in the contract 
and does not reduce the price, it has put itself in an inferior position in the market 
because rational consumers would select other suppliers. This argument presumes that, 
firstly, consumers are adequately rational and, secondly, there are no factors other than 
the conflicts clause that may affect the price. Both presumptions are unrealistic. Firstly, 
consumers can barely make truly rational choices. Many e-consumers simply enter into 
contracts without carefully calculating the risk or making any comparison. Although 
some e-consumers may rely on the comparison website to help make decisions, the 
website usually only compares the price without any warnings on the potential remedy 
risk in the future. Furthermore, most consumers would not actually read the business’s 
terms and conditions, and even if they read, they would not pay attention to any 
conflicts clauses. Therefore, it is unrealistic to argue that the business will be obliged 
to adjust their price to reflect the risk brought about by the conflict of laws. Secondly, 
even if consumers are rational enough to link the price with the conflicts clause (which 
is highly unlikely in practice), there are many other factors that affect the price, such as 
the cost of production, transportation, storage, staffing, management and legal risk. 
Putting all the relevant factors together, the cost of legal risk only affects the final price 
very lightly. Within the legal risk, the additional risk associated with cross-border 
litigation occupies an even smaller proportion.82 The argument to rely on the market to 
protect consumers is unrealistic. 
It is thus concluded that the EU protective conflicts rules are necessary and they do 
not cause great inefficiency in economic terms. The legal framework, in general, 
balances the two objectives of protecting the weaker party and providing commercial 
certainty. The competent court and applicable law in most cases are easily predictable. 
However, uncertainty continues to exist in classification between ordinary contracts 
and consumer contracts and also in the application of the targeting test. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The EU conflicts rules in cross-border contracts have been improved continuously. A 
lot of previous difficulties that hampered the effective application of the law in practice 
have been addressed by the later reforms and the CJEU’s judgments. All those reforms 
and interpretations have shown a consistent tendency to improve certainty and 
predictability for the parties. Certainty is an objective not only in ordinary commercial 
contracts, but also in contracts with inequality of bargaining power. Although the 
protective conflicts rules make fairness the most important goal, they also seek to 
balance fairness and certainty. It is necessary to note that certainty may not necessarily 
lead to efficiency. The law can only promote commercial efficiency if it allocates risk 
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in the most appropriate and reasonably predictable way. As a result, certainty cannot be 
achieved by establishing rigid and improper rules. In ordinary commercial contracts, 
authorities should trust sophisticated commercial participants which are in the best 
position to allocate their own commercial risk, and provide them with as much 
autonomy as they can. The law will only be there to assist such autonomy to be 
exercised in a mutually predictable manner. In the absence of autonomy, certainty is 
achieved by considering the most reasonable expectations of rational businessmen in 
this field and the rules should avoid being too rigid. In consumer contracts, certainty 
should be achieved by appropriate legal intervention, given the existence of inequality 
of power. It is fair to conclude that the EU conflicts scheme in contractual litigation is 
generally successful in providing certainty without sacrificing other important values 
in both commercial and consumer contracts. 
However, uncertainty continues to exist, though only on a small number of 
occasions. Uncertainty is mainly caused by ambiguous and not well thought-through 
legislative provisions; inconsistent and unclear CJEU interpretation in some cases; and 
inconsistency between jurisdiction and choice of law rules. They are not fundamentally 
problematic but small weaknesses reduce certainty and efficiency of cross-border 
transactions. These weaknesses are relatively easy to address by updating the legislation 
or the CJEU’s interpretation. Attention should be paid to the consistency between 
existing judgments on the same provision and related provisions. Guidance needs to be 
detailed enough to avoid different implementation and misunderstanding by national 
courts.  
 
